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Abstract: To facilitate energy transition, regulators have devised ‘regulatory sandboxes’ to create
a participatory experimentation environment for exploring revision of energy law in several
countries. These sandboxes allow for a two-way regulatory dialogue between an experimenter and
an approachable regulator to innovate regulation and enable new socio-technical arrangements.
However, these experiments do not take place in a vacuum but need to be formulated and implemented
in a multi-actor, polycentric decision-making system through collaboration with the regulator but
also energy sector incumbents, such as the distribution system operator. Therefore, we are exploring
new roles and power division changes in the energy sector as a result of such a regulatory sandbox.
We researched the Dutch executive order ‘experiments decentralized, sustainable electricity production’
(EDSEP) that invites homeowners’ associations and energy cooperatives to propose projects that
are prohibited by extant regulation. Local experimenters can, for instance, organise peer-to-peer
supply and determine their own tariffs for energy transport in order to localize, democratize,
and decentralize energy provision. Theoretically, we rely on Ostrom’s concept of polycentricity
to study the dynamics between actors that are involved in and engaging with the participatory
experiments. Empirically, we examine four approved EDSEP experiments through interviews and
document analysis. Our conclusions focus on the potential and limitations of bottom-up, participatory
innovation in a polycentric system. The most important lessons are that a more holistic approach to
experimentation, inter-actor alignment, providing more incentives, and expert and financial support
would benefit bottom-up participatory innovation.
Keywords: polycentricity; local energy initiatives; community energy; smart grid; legal innovation;
socio-technical innovation; bottom-up
1. Introduction
Perhaps one of the most critical issues for the energy transition is matching sustainable energy
supply and demand, and especially managing the local peak loads and the influx of prosumer energy
since many renewables are intermittent resources. For now, the existing grid is used for balancing, but
when renewable electricity production and use further increase, the grid capacity will not be sufficient
and reinforcement will be very expensive. New options for grid management that have been explored
are smart meters, smart grids, demand response, and storage technologies to reduce peak loads and
manage congestion. These technological developments create opportunities for new roles in the energy
system, such as aggregators [1–3].
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New technological developments are also relevant from a prosumer perspective [4,5]. Until recently,
project partners in smart grid projects perceived users primarily as a barrier [6], or as passive subscribers
to grid services [7]. Planko et al. show that end-users are scarcely represented in the system-building
networks that are active in the development of the Dutch smart grid sector [8]. Yet, times are changing
with the increase of local energy initiatives [9], which increasingly broaden their activities that aim
to further influence the direction and pace of the energy transition [10]. Potentially, local energy
initiatives can extend their role from energy generation to performing active functions within the smart
grid. They could ‘actively offer services that electric utilities, transmission service operators or other
prosumers have to bid for’ [11] (p.4), such as offering storage capacity for balancing, or avoiding grid
reinforcement through flattening the usage profile and increasing real-time use and local storage [12].
Local energy initiatives or other local actors would need to be enabled to organise a more integrated
resource management at the local or regional level to extend and optimise such services. For instance,
peer-to-peer supply and flexible tariffs could increase local use.
However, the extant law is sometimes a limiting factor for energy management innovation towards
a renewable energy (RE)-based system that needs matching demand and supply both in terms of
available energy and grid capacity [3]. For instance, for household consumers, law might need to
enable pricing of grid services based on actual loads instead of connection capacity.
Several countries’ regulators have devised ‘regulatory sandboxes’ to create a participatory
experimentation environment for exploring revision of energy law to overcome such legal obstacles
for energy transition. A main characteristic of these sandboxes is that they allow for a two-way
regulatory dialogue between an experimenter and a regulator to innovate regulation and enable new
socio-technical arrangements. For instance, in the Netherlands, the executive order ‘experiments
decentralized, sustainable electricity production’ (EDSEP) allows for the implementation of innovative
energy services at the local level [13,14]. Another example is the UK, where innovators can get a
temporary derogation of some rules in order to run a trial if the proposed product or service is
considered to be genuinely innovative and able to deliver consumer benefits [15]. Importantly, new
actors, such as local energy initiatives, take centre stage in these sandbox experiments, and they are
seen as a locus of agency, in contrast with ‘business as usual’ in smart grid experiments, as described
above [6–8].
What is especially interesting about these experiments is that, while experimenters can take on
new roles due to exemptions, they do not operate in a vacuum, but experiments need to be designed
and implemented in a multi-actor, multi-centered decision-making system. Such a system was coined
by V. Ostrom et al. as a polycentric system [16] and was further elaborated by E. Ostrom [17,18]. In the
particular polycentric system in this study, the experimenters need to collaborate with the regulator,
but also energy sector incumbents, such as the distribution system operator.
Little is known regarding the functioning and innovative potential of local energy initiatives
as experimenters in polycentric actor-constellations [19], while they are earmarked as potential
providers of new grid services in such a system by governments creating these experimentation
environments [11]. Our central question, therefore, is: What can be learnt about local energy initiatives’
bottom-up experimentation with smart grids in a polycentric energy system? By answering this
question, we aim to provide policy relevant insights regarding the preconditions for and obstacles to
using end-user collectives as innovators informing new energy regulation, which is more facilitative of
the integration of renewables within the limits of the grid. Furthermore, we would like to introduce
the polycentricity concept to the community energy literature and demonstrate its value to better
understand the relationality and interdependencies in governing energy.
To research this, we focus on the aforementioned case of the Dutch EDSEP, which invites
homeowners’ associations and energy cooperatives to propose projects that are prohibited by extant
energy regulation. Local experimenters can, for instance, organize peer-to-peer supply and determine
their own tariffs for energy transport in order to localize, democratize, and decentralize sustainable
energy provision. We further introduce our case in Section 2. Subsequently, we elaborate on our
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theoretical framework, in particular the concept polycentricity, in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe
the used case study methodology and introduce the four EDSEP projects that are analyzed in-depth.
Afterwards, we will describe the polycentric configuration under the EDSEP, and the functioning
of the experimenters in this configuration in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the article with
a discussion of our findings in a broader context and the value of the polycentricity literature for
studying the potential and limitations of bottom-up, participatory innovation in a polycentric system.
2. Policy Background and Introduction EDSEP
In this section, we introduce the policy developments that led to the EDSEP, and the EDSEP itself.
2.1. Policy Background
The direct reason for the EDSEP is the 2013 Social and Economic Council (SER) energy agreement
for sustainable growth between over 40 Dutch organizations and supported by the Dutch national
government [13]. In the text of the energy agreement, it is stated that: “To realize the energy transition
the legislation needs to be providing a consistent framework to provide investors with long-term
security. In addition, the legislation needs to facilitate innovation. This means that the legislation
needs to provide sufficient space to enable desired new developments, specifically when it comes to
the production of RE. To this end, the Gas and Electricity Acts will be revised” [20]. For the revision,
the Dutch government had established the legislative agenda STROOM (abbreviation of streamlining,
optimizing and modernizing, in Dutch: STROomlijnen, Optimaliseren en Moderniseren), which had
achieving clearer and simpler rules to reduce bureaucracy, streamlining with European legislation,
and being facilitative of a competitive economy and transition towards as sustainable energy system as
its goal. This legislative proposal offered a merger of the Electricity Act 1998 and the Gas Act [21].
However, instead of waiting for the new Gas and Electricity Act, the parties in favor of local,
sustainable energy lobbied to make use of article 7a sub 1 of the Electricity Act 1998. This article
states that, through executive order, in accordance with European Union legislation, the Electricity
Act can be derogated from by the experiment [22]. The article intends to enable relatively small-scale,
localised, RE experiments for which the strictly regulated separation between the commercial activities
production and supply, and the publicly managed distribution side of the energy system can be relaxed,
to a certain extent under specified conditions for a particular target group of homeowners associations
(HOAs) and cooperatives.
Such derogation has to be laid down in an executive order (in Dutch: Algemene Maatregel
van Bestuur) and it has taken the shape as the EDSEP, which entered into force on the 28th of February
2015. The objective of the EDSEP is stated in its explanatory memorandum and it is to observe
whether it is necessary to strictly apply the rules of the current Electricity Act for decentrally produced
renewable electricity.
2.2. Executive Order ‘Decentral, Sustainable Electricity Production Experiments’
To informedly revise the Electricity Act, the Dutch government strives to obtain more knowledge
regarding grid stabilization by prosumers and obstacles that are created by present regulations. For this
reason, the Executive order ‘Decentral, sustainable electricity production experiments’(in Dutch:
Besluit experimenten decentrale duurzame elektriciteitsopwekking) was designed [23]. The goals of
the executive order are stimulation of more renewable energy (RE) at the local level, more efficient
use of the existing energy infrastructure, and more involvement of energy consumers with their own
energy supply.
It provides energy cooperatives or HOAs the opportunity to get an exemption from the Electricity
Act and carry out the functions of the grid operator. The cooperatives and HOAs can carry out two
main types of experiments:
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- the project grids up to 500 users. In this case, the grid is owned by the project and has only one
connection to the public grid;
- the larger experiments up to 10,000 users and 5 MW generative capacity, usually in cooperation
with the grid operator. The grid operator remains owner of the grid. These experiments are
concerned with balancing the electricity grid through peak shaving, and dynamic electricity tariffs.
The size of the experiments is chosen, so that the projects remain manageable and the general
security and safety of the electricity provision on the regional grid will be guaranteed. Safeguarding
provision within the projects is the responsibility of the participants of the projects. Thus, the protection
of the consumer is partly taken care of through the assumed control that the participant can exert in
the cooperative or HOA. The members should hold each other accountable for the responsibilities of
the local energy initiative regarding production, supply, and transport.
Initiatives that are willing to make use of the EDSEP need to apply at the Netherlands Enterprising
Agency (in Dutch: Rijksdienst voor ondernemend Nederland, RVO) for the derogation of the Electricity
Act. Yearly, 10 projects of both types could be admitted, but only a total of 18 projects have been
approved (see Appendix A), and only few are actually being implemented. The admission started in
2015 and ended in 2018. The experiments will be evaluated in early 2020.
3. EDSEP Experimenters As Decision-Making Unit in a Polycentric System
The EDSEP is designed to identify the obstacles that the extant Electricity Act presents to the
development of local collective solutions to the production of more RE and its more efficient use.
When experiments receive derogation under the EDSEP, this means that they become part of a system
with decision-making units at several levels, with whom they have to cooperate, or by whom they
are supervised or even opposed. These include, amongst others, grid operators, energy companies,
the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Climate and its executive organization RVO.
A polycentric approach is suitable for analysing the functioning of these experiments as part
of such a larger system in which decision-making power is distributed [24], and it has been used
for previous work on smart grids [25,26]. Polycentricity means that there are “many centres of
decision-making which are formally independent of each other” [16], but which in practice often need
to collaborate with others to execute what they are formally allowed to do. For instance, in the case of
the EDSEP experiments, experimenters pursuing a project grid only formally need to discuss their
plans regarding grid design and distribution with the regional distribution system operator (DSO),
as they are allowed to take the role of DSO in their mini-grid, but in practice the approval of the
regional DSO is important for obtaining the exemption.
Polycentric systems are characterised in the literature as being multi-level, multi-sectoral,
multi-functional, and multi-type, as displayed in Table 1 [26,27]. We will use these concepts to describe the
polycentric setting in which the experiments operate in Section 4.1, as the authority of a decision-making
centre in energy regulations is defined by these characteristics. For instance, a locally functioning
energy initiative is a private sector initiative and has therefore previously been excluded from the
function grid management, as it was deemed a public good.
We rely on Ostrom et al. [16] for the analysis of the polycentric system, who propose four criteria
to evaluate the well-functioning of a polycentric system: control, political representation, efficiency,
and local autonomy. We briefly define these criteria in Table 2.
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Table 1. Aspects of polycentric constellations based on [26,27].
Aspects Definition
Multi-level Geographical level of scale (e.g., local, regional, provincial, national, and global)
Multi-sectoral Actors are active in different sectors (e.g., public, semi-public, voluntary, community-based,private, and hybrid kinds)
Multi-functional Different functions are performed by different actors (i.e., specialized units for differentfunctions, such as production, provision, sale, financing, etc.)
Multi-type
Several types of jurisdictions are present at the same time (e.g., territorial jurisdictions:
nested, multi-purpose jurisdictions; and organizations with functional jurisdiction:
specialized, cross-territorial organizations)
Table 2. Criteria for evaluating the functioning of polycentric decision-making systems [16].
Criteria Definition
Control Formal powers of the decision-making unit within the applicable legal frameworks;
Efficiency Whether the collaboration between the multiple decision-making centres hasadvantages for getting to the desired outcome;
Local autonomy The power of local stakeholders to be a decision-making unit;
Political
representation




We study the EDSEP as a multiple case study. Case study research allows for in depth analysis of
a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context and the combination of various complementary
research methods [28]. Our sample of cases includes four projects that were approved under the
EDSEP: Schoonschip, Endona, Collegepark Zwijsen, and Aardehuizen. All of these started relatively
early (in 2015 or 2016) and their projects have reached an advanced stage. Two of these are so-called
large experiments and two are project nets, so both types of experiments that are possible within the
EDSEP are equally well represented.
Many (web-)documents that describe the four cases are available, and for each case the project
initiators or other participants heavily involved in the development have been interviewed in a
semi-structured face-to-face interview. Although these representatives provided us with key information
for this research, we acknowledge that other participants to the experiments could have different
perspectives. Furthermore, we conducted interviews with other relevant actors in the polycentric system
related to the EDSEP, mostly telephonic. Appendix B presents an overview of the interviewees.
This information has been analysed through reflexive thematic analysis, starting with the criteria
indicating the functioning of polycentric systems as analytical framework. The coding has been based
on the six-step methodology of Braun et al. [29], which consists of the steps: familiarisation, generating
codes, constructing themes, revising themes, defining themes, and writing the report. We used the
qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti for our analysis.
4.2. Cases
Via Tables 3–6, we will shortly introduce all four of our case studies based on their project type,
delineation of the experiment, its organization and governance, its energy system, and the use of
the EDSEP.
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Table 3. Case study description Endona.
Aspects Description
Project type Large experiment
Delineation The first pilot is in the village of Heeten, but eventually Endona wants to supply the medium voltagegrid (part Raalte) with locally produced RE as well as increase the region’s real-time electricity use.
Organisation
and governance
Endona is an energy cooperative, with the board members registered as its members. This structure
has been chosen to keep the decision-making with its day-to-day management. Endona has a large
portfolio of projects and is part of several collaborations with grid operators, technology developers
and knowledge institutions.
Energy system
With some of its partners, Endona installed sea salt batteries. It also implemented household level
energy management systems (EMSs) 1 in a neighbourhood with 47 households [30], and an
overarching EMS that uses the inputs from these EMS for neighbourhood level optimisation.
Furthermore, Endona developed a solar park with 7200 photovoltaic (PV) panels on 3.5 ha of
former agricultural land.
Use of EDSEP
The derogation has not yet been effectuated. The cooperative only acts as producer and does
balancing experiments that are allowed within the framework of the current Electricity Act.
At present, the electricity sale is through a cooperative energy company. Endona has not found a
suitable business model for being energy supplier, and is investigating the financial risks. In the long
run, it wants to take on this role so both the costs and benefits of the energy system are local, and they
can possibly offer a lower price to their users because of the integrated management.
1 An EMS is a system of computer-aided tools used by to monitor, control, and optimize the performance of the
energy system.
Table 4. Case study description Aardehuizen.
Aspects Description
Project type Large experiment
Delineation
The location is at the outskirts of the village of Olst, and is situated in a rural landscape. Incidentally,
it is near Heeten, where our first case, Endona, is located. Aardehuizen is in contact with Endona.
23 houses have been built, of which 3 rental social houses, and a community house.
Organisation
and governance
The project is operated by a HOA and part of a worldwide movement, Earth Ships, which wants to
build houses with little environmental impact built from recycled and regionally sourced material.
The project’s decision -making system is a sociocracy, which means everyone is involved and
informed, although decisions are not made by consensus. The occupants of the rental houses are
also a member of the HOA.
Energy system
Electricity generation in Aardehuizen is realised by PV-panels on individual houses, while at a later
stage collective PV may be placed at a parking lot. The PV panels are privately owned, but the battery
will be collectively owned. A collective battery is under investigation, in cooperation with a different
higher education institution. No gas connection is present, and because the energy performance
coefficient of the buildings is almost zero, the little auxiliary heating that is required is done with
heat pumps and wood stoves.
Next to the direct current (DC) grid, in the future, an inverter will be placed, to make storage possible.
Some of the houses have a private EMS. An investigation is ongoing to place EMSs in all houses,
which can be connected to a higher level collectively owned EMS. Not all households are connected
yet, because not all participants are certain about their privacy. Smart appliances and smart
connectors are under investigation.
Use of EDSEP
At present, the HOA acts as producer.
Once the collective smart grid is in place, peer-to-peer supply based on dynamic tariffs is planned.
At this moment, every household has its own energy supplier. Later, an external cooperative energy
company will buy and sell electricity, and handle the administration of the project. Ownership of the
grid was not feasible financially as the grid was already in place and the grid was too expensive
compared to the benefits of having Aardehuizen managing it.
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Table 5. Case study description Collegepark Zwijsen.
Aspects Description
Project type Project grid
Delineation The project consists of a HOA for 115 apartments built in a monumental, former school building in thevillage Veghel, in the south of the Netherlands.
Organisation &
governance
The derogation for a project grid has been arranged by the project developer before the houses were
sold. The HOA has been set up by the developer so that the residents can use it as a vehicle to decide
on matters related to their energy system.
Energy system
Collegepark Zwijsen has solar PV and solar collectors. These installations are jointly owned (in Dutch:
mandeligheid). All households are connected to one shared large-scale use connection to the national
grid. Grid balancing measures will be achieved through individual EMSs for each household. No
smart appliances are involved in the project for reasons of privacy. The EMSs, in combination with
dynamic tariffs are expected to incentivize the apartment owners to better align demand to supply.
Storage will be as heat, not as electricity.
Use of EDSEP
The HOA acts as supplier, producer and distributor, but is not a balance responsible party (BRP).
Project grid management, management of the energy technologies and the administration of energy
use for billing are done by an external organization affiliated with the project developer.
The apartment owners will pay a fee for these services commissioned by the HOA.
The initial tariff structure is in place and approved by regulator ACM. The occupants are guaranteed
to a 3-year zero energy charge, provided their consumption remains within a certain bandwidth. Later
on, grid balancing is seen as a way to negotiate better tariffs, and then the HOA will be involved in
deciding upon tariffs and new investments.
Table 6. Case study description Schoonschip.
Aspects Description
Project type Project grid
Delineation Schoonschip is an HOA of the owners of 46 houseboats and one communal boat in the Amsterdamquarter Buiksloterham, which is a city quarter that develops all kinds of sustainable building projects.
Organisation &
governance
The project was started by a group of friends, who were later joined by other friends and
acquaintances. There are other goals than RE, e.g., wastewater treatment, and the use of recycled
building materials. The board of the HOA is responsible for daily decisions. Working groups have
been established, e.g., in supervising the building process. These working groups may give
presentations about their findings, to keep all members involved. For some decisions it is necessary
for all members of the HOA to be present.
Energy system
The boats are all-electric, part of a project grid, and connected to the national grid via one connection.
The HOA generates electricity through individually owned solar panels. Batteries are placed on each
boat, but collectively owned. Shared electric vehicles are part of future plans. The administration and
some of the maintenance are done collectively.
A smart grid is in place, and every household has an EMS. The smart grid is part of a project of a
consortium with external expertise, which researches the optimization of smart grid technologies and
algorithms [31]. Dynamic tariffs are not foreseen as part of demand management. Efficiency should
occur through the smart grid: using and storing electricity when production is high. Eventually,
the energy management should result in providing electricity to the main grid at the highest price.
Use of EDSEP
The HOA acts as supplier, producer and distributor. The administration of electricity use and supply
is outsourced to a commercial electricity company, which acts as BRP and provides electricity when a
shortage occurs, and buys surplus electricity.
5. Results
In this section, we first discuss the polycentric constellation of actors that EDSEP experimenters
need to function in, and thereafter we analyse the well-functioning of the experiments in this context.
5.1. The Polycentric Constellation of Actors Under the EDSEP
In this section, we will introduce the polycentric energy system that EDSEP experimenters are part
of and function within (see Figure 1 for an overview). The selection of the actors that we discuss here
is limited to actors that are directly involved in EDSEP experiments, and therefore does not include
actors, such as the high voltage system operator.
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electricity when the projects do not meet demand with their own production. They take care of the 
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Energy suppliers that supply to small scale users, such as households, need a supply permit. 
This permit is given by ACM when the supplier can show amongst others that supply will be reliable, 
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the conditions of the Electricity Act. Under these conditions, it is not feasible for local energy 
initiatives to act as the supplier. However, a few cooperative energy suppliers exist that supply 
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• Energy supplier
Dutch energy companies are traditionally large, nationally operating, private companies. In recent
years, some cooperative energy companies have been founded that are closely related to local energy
initiatives and seek to return at least part of the benefits to the region.
The functional energy companies receive surplus electricity from the projects and deliver electricity
when the projects do not meet demand with their own production. They take care of the administration
and billing for the electricity produced and consumed.
Energy suppliers that supply to small scale users, such as households, need a supply permit. This
permit is given by ACM when the supplier can show amongst others that supply will be reliable, tariffs
are reasonable, and the company is financially, organisationally and technically compliant with the
conditions of the Electricity Act. Under these conditions, it is not feasible for local energy initiatives
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to act as the supplier. However, a few cooperative energy suppliers exist that supply energy that
is produced by a growing number of local energy initiatives. These suppliers are cooperatives of
cooperatives, of which local energy initiatives producing energy are member.
Furthermore, an energy supplier needs to have balance responsibility (in Dutch:
programmaverantwoordelijkheid) or have a contract with a balance responsible party (BRP). The BRPs
share the responsibility of balancing and they have to inform grid operators about their planned
injections, offtakes, and transports. At the moment, experimenters are not able to take up balance
responsibility and they rely on the larger national energy companies to provide this function for them.
• DSO
The DSOs in the Netherlands are territorially organized, monopolist utility companies that operate
regionally. They are specialised in the transport of electricity and the maintenance and extension of
the grid.
As utility companies, they are subject to forms of public control and regulation. The Authority for
Consumers and Markets yearly determines the tariffs that the DSOs can charge to their clients to connect
them, be connected and transport energy, and how much profit they can make on their investments.
In the large projects, the DSO remains the owner and manager of the grid, but, in the project grids,
the grid is part of the project, and is built and maintained by the experimenters. The DSOs are asked
by RVO to give a reaction on the project grids, and they try to be involved in the design of these grids.
They want to be formally involved in the process towards the derogation.
The DSOs have considerable experience and they are well equipped to build and maintain grids.
However, as the regulatory focus in the Netherlands is primarily on the public values of affordability
and availability of supply, the safeguarding of sustainability is prioritized at a much lower level [4,32].
While DSOs can benefit from the sustainability experiments, they are concerned about the knowledge
that is present among the experimenters to perform DSO tasks. After the 10-year-derogation, the project
grid has to be potentially handed over to the DSOs, and they wonder whether the quality of these
grids will be sufficient, and who must pay the costs if this is not the case.
• ACM
The ACM is a nationally and functionally operating, independent public organization. It is a
business regulation agency, which is charged with competition oversight, sector-specific regulation for
several sectors, and enforcement of consumer protection laws. In the context of the EDSEP, the ACM
checks the calculation method for the energy and transport tariffs if the energy experiment wants to
take over the task of the supplier and the DSO.
• Tax authority
The tax authority is a nationally and functionally operating public organization. It is tasked with
the tax collection and customs service of the Dutch government and it is part of the Ministry of Finance.
It levies and collects the energy tax on electricity (in Dutch: Energiebelasting elektriciteit). This is a
type of environmental tax that disincentivizes use. The energy tax per kWh for 0–10,000 kWh electricity
was in 2019 € 0.09863 [33]. This is a large share of the average electricity price in the first quarter of 2019
of € 0.203 per kWh for households using 2.5–5 MWh [34]. In the experiments, it is dependent on the
circumstances within each project whether energy tax needs to be paid, and no special conditions exist.
Another tax that needs to be paid is for the storage of renewable energy (in Dutch: Opslag
duurzame energie), which is € 0.0189 per kWh until 10,000 kWh [33]. In addition, a payment of 21%
VAT is charged over supply costs, transport costs, and levies.
• RVO
RVO is an executive organization of the ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, which operates
nationally in the public domain with a functional agenda targeted at executing policies that support
Dutch enterprising. RVO provides the derogation to the projects and supervises its implementation.
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Once or twice a year it organizes meet-ups for the experiments, together with the national platform
organisation for community energy, Hieropgewekt. Here, projects can create a community of practice
and share learning experiences.
The types of experiments under the EDSEP are left rather open to see what kind legal changes
are required to facilitate energy transition. This meant that some of the problems that the projects
encountered were not foreseen, e.g., whether energy tax needed to be paid was first also not clear
to RVO.
• Experimenting HOA or cooperative
The experimenters are locally operating, territorial decision-making units. The HOA’s and
cooperatives themselves are voluntary bodies, but a hybrid sometimes develops where a private party
is the main developer and is either founding the HOA or cooperative, or paid by it to take on an
important role in the design of the experiment. The functions that an experiment can fulfil under the
EDSEP in the energy system can be any type of activity in the domain of energy production, supply, or
grid management for projects grids, whereas large experiments are more constrained (see Section 2.2).
• Municipality, provincial government, and European Union
The governmental bodies are, similarly to the previously described departments of the national
government, public, territorial bodies, which operate at their respective scales. In the context of
the EDSEP, these governments have played various roles in the polycentric energy system, such as
subsidizer and provider of permits. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.4 regarding
political representation.
5.2. The Functioning of the Experiments in Their Polycentric Environment
We will now discuss the functioning of the EDSEP experiments within the afore-described Dutch,
polycentric energy system, based on the criteria from our conceptual framework: control, efficiency,
local autonomy, and political representation.
5.2.1. Control
Under the EDSEP, experimenters can carry out several tasks that were not permitted under the
current Dutch model. Energy transport and grid management are considered to be a public utility,
and production and supply are commercial activities. Without the EDSEP, the experiments can only
be active in production and supply. However, supply requires a specific permit and it is not feasible
for most local energy cooperatives or HOA’s due to the required scale of customer base and financial
risk. Before 2014, most of the energy cooperatives that acted as supplier sold electricity through energy
companies as reseller, while using a so-called white label construction [35]. Others outsource tasks,
such as administration and balance responsibility, to a back office of one of these companies while still
using their own brand and image [36].
With a derogation, experiments can take over the tasks of both the energy supplier and the DSO,
to the extent that they deem to be most beneficial for their projects. Note that derogations only apply
to specific articles of the Electricity Act [23]. Other laws and regulations, such as the General Data
Protection Regulation, continue to be applicable. In short, the derogation presents the following
opportunities to derogate from the Electricity Act
• derogation from the prohibition to carry out DSO tasks;
• derogation from the obligation to have a supply permit;
• freedom to determine grid tariffs, tariff structures, and requirements as set by ACM. ACM only
checks the method by which the tariffs are determined, not the tariff itself;
• derogation from certain specific rules that apply to data processing (which are mainly about
the requirement to participate in sector-wide discussions to align data related procedures to the
benefit of the consumer);
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• derogation from certain specific rules regarding transparency and liquidity of the energy market
(which are mainly about the right of the government to create additional requirements regarding
supply conditions and information provision in case of an illiquid market); and,
• derogation from rules regarding metering device requirements.
There are regulations that limit the control of the experiment. One of these that poses a particular
threat to the experimenters is the European Union (EU) legal obligation to provide third-party access
to a network whether it is a public or a private network (see article 32 Third electricity directive,
2003/54/EG. Pb EU L 211/55.). This means that participants need to be able to choose another energy
supplier. From the perspective of the experimenters, this third-party access is a threat, because it can
undermine the business model, as only as much energy is allowed to be generated as the projected use
of the participants [23]. Moreover, collective energy management and storage are at risk when the user
group decreases. The installations are dimensioned to supply for the initially projected users, and part
of the production capacity can potentially not be used anymore if the user number decreases. A reason
for this is that the government wants to keep the experiments as self-contained as possible to minimize
the risk of blackouts or safety issues in surrounding areas.
Secondly, the prohibition of a flexible transport tariff limits the control of the experiments.
Currently, it is only allowed for the DSO to charge a fixed daily transport tariff that is proportional to
the capacity of the grid connection [37]. This limits the attractiveness of balancing, as the DSO cannot
vary the costs based on the actual used capacity.
Finally, non-energy legislation can also limit the control of experiments over their project.
For instance, project grids are only attractive when there is no existing grid and, therefore, go along
with the development of houses or apartments. The experimenters then need to obtain a building
permit and might need to obtain permission from an aesthetics committee of the built environment.
For instance, for Collegepark Zwijsen it was hard to get the design with solar collectors on the façade
approved, as it was first deemed to negatively affect spatial quality.
5.2.2. Efficiency
Having an experiment under the EDSEP can lead to a number of cost savings for the participants.
We list the most important below [38]:
• Grid connection and DSO transport costs for project grids: A one-time saving on the grid
connection costs can be realized. Experimenters that newly construct a grid can save costs, because
one high-volume connection to the regional grid is cheaper than the sum total of connections for
individual dwellings to the regional grid. This is a financial incentive to balance the energy on
project grids, because, the smaller the connection with the regional grid required, the lower the
connection costs. Furthermore, the periodical transport costs that need to be paid to the DSO are
also lower when the capacity of the connection is lower. This can result in a rather significant
saving as the DSO costs are about 1/3 of the total electricity bill.
To give an example: The total of the DSO tariffs for a household with an average 3× 25 A connection
at the DSO Stedin € 230.36 (other DSOs do not differ much in their tariffs) [39]. Schoonschip
annually pays € 6759.74 according to their business model, which comes down to an average of
€ 225.32 per dwelling. As this is an all-electric neighborhood, where the electricity consumption is
higher, the balancing brings these dwellings back to rather average DSO costs).
However, if dwellings do not have their own connection to the grid, they miss out on the annual
levy rebate for a part of the energy tax.
• DSO transport costs for large grids: the periodical transport costs on a large grid can be reduced
by creating a virtual connection through a shared code for a group of participants that cooperate
to create balance. The lower the required peak capacity, the lower the transport costs. Additional
costs can be saved by helping the DSO to realize a flat usage profile (using the same capacity of
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the grid throughout the day), because this has value to the DSO. However, sufficiently adjustable
capacity is needed for this.
• Energy tariff of large net: If the experiment can realize the aforementioned flat usage profile, it can
potentially negotiate a lower tariff for the energy that it does not generate with its own capacity
and needs to buy from an external supplier.
• Fixed supplier costs: Most energy suppliers charge a fixed supply tariff. If the experiment (project
grid or large experiment) has one connection, these costs are lower than when each individual
user would need to conclude a contract with the supplier. However, costs need to be made to
measure the usage within the project and bill the participants.
When the EDSEP started, not all of the decision-making units were familiar with the regulation,
because RVO did not prepare them for working with the EDSEP. This led to various instances
when the experimenters needed to explain the regulations to the DSOs, ACM, and the tax authority.
The compartmentalization of DSOs had a negative impact on the progress of projects, because the
functioning of decision-making units within DSOs was not always well aligned. Accordingly, after
informing and convincing the civil-servants in one unit, experimenters met with resistance of the
executive staff, and had to re-explain their plans. RVO has asked organizations that have dealings with
EDSEP-experiments to assign a case-manager with whom the projects can communicate at an early
stage to improve this situation.
The scale is another efficiency related factor. It is questionable whether the experiments are an
interesting party for the DSO to do business with for grid balancing. Grid operators could for example
contract experimenters to make use of their storage capacity, or compensate them for the investment
costs of grid reinforcement that are avoided by the experiment. However, some grid operators prefer
to deal with larger parties and find projects with a size of up to 10,000 households too small and not
very interesting to buy flexibility from. The creation of a legal requirement to buy balancing services
through tendering could be a solution here, giving priority to small-scale providers. Or oblige DSOs to
buy local balancing services for a price that reflects their value. Historically, such a similar obligation
has been embedded in the law for DSOs regarding grid connection to make sure energy production
and consumption would be accessible at any location in the country.
Furthermore, energy tax needing to be paid twice for stored energy is a major inefficiency [40]
(once when the electricity is uploaded in a battery and once when it is taken out again). As the energy
tax is a high proportion of the energy price (see footnote 5), this limits experimentation with storage
solutions. Unfortunately, alignment between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate and the
Ministry of Finance to avoid this double taxation has been lacking. In the near future, this problem
will no longer occur, because the EU has adopted the ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans’ package, which
states that owners of storage facilities should not be subject to any double taxation [41].
Additionally, the interpretation of current energy tax rules makes the experiments less efficient.
Energy tax can be saved if the ownership structures make sure that there is no supply to third parties,
and the participants make use of their own production and distribution capacity. However, a third
party is a party with a different real estate valuation tax object, according to the taxation criteria
(REV-object, in Dutch: woz-object). Each house or apartment is a REV tax object, and, therefore, energy
tax on electricity needs to be paid when a participant uses energy from the production installation of
another participant. A possible solution would be for the municipal government to register the houses
as one REV-object (this has no consequences for the REV-tax and the procedure is the same as for other
REV-tax objects with multiple owners).
Moreover, whilst DSOs embrace the goal of the EDSEP to keep production and consumption
local, they fear that private project grids threaten the socialization model that underlies Dutch grid
management. The DSOs have the perception that some experiments are motivated by the evasion of the
energy tax, as it appeared at first to some participants that this tax would not apply for the experiments.
Last, but certainly not least, the experimenters need to fully comprehend a whole gamut of
complicated energy related regulation to be successful. Misinterpretation can lead to a worsening of
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the business model and can, ultimately, lead to an inviable project. Experimenters progressed slowly
despite some support from RVO and Hieropgewekt due to this complexity. Slow progress even led to
the strange situation that the government has decided to draft a follow-up EDSEP without waiting for
the formal evaluation of the present experiments.
5.2.3. Local Autonomy
Formally, for experimenters, the two structures to self-organize and function as a decision-making
unit in the polycentric energy system are HOA and cooperative.
While HOA and cooperative seem to be structures that are explicitly designed for high commitment
of the involved households, these do not, per se, imply a high level of participation of all participants.
For example, Endona is a cooperative, but only its board members are members to keep decision-making
with the daily management. The organizational structure is primarily set up to run the sub-projects
efficiently, it is not geared to involve many local participants. A second example is Collegepark Zwijsen,
which was designed without input from its future inhabitants. The derogation was applied for by its
project developer, but assigned to the HOA, which was not yet in existence at that time. The HOA
only started its regular meetings after the residents started living in the apartments. From then on,
the autonomy of the HOA will be larger, as it will decide on topics, such as maintenance and tariffs.
The other two HOA’s, Aardehuizen and Schoonschip, functioned from the beginning of the
projects as decision-making units run by the future inhabitants. Both outsourced tasks to professional
parties, but took the decisions about project design themselves. The working groups prepared proposals
about e.g., sustainability, but these decisions were then taken collectively.
All of the projects, except Zwijsen, which is entirely professionally developed, mention that
working as a HOA or a cooperative with participation based on the input of volunteers, who are mostly
not professionals in the field of energy, has made it harder to function as a local decision-making
unit, because they need to invent the wheel by themselves and it was not always easy to acquire all
of the required information for informed choices. Additionally, in the communication with other
decision-making units such as DSOs, the tax service and ACM, the status as cooperative or HOA
was by times a disadvantage and they needed to first convince the other parties of their know-how
and professionality.
5.2.4. Political Representation
The municipal government was the political body that was most involved in the projects.
Sometimes the relationship with the local government depended on the political tide, but most projects
had a productive working relationship with the municipality and felt supported. Two projects got a
municipal subsidy: Endona for a feasibility study for its solar park, Schoonschip a contribution per
household for the high energy efficiency of the houses.
Additionally, motions at the local council functioned as a mechanism to realise political
representation of the interests of projects in local politics. Aardehuizen and Collegepark Zwijsen both
benefited from political motions. Aardehuizen benefited from a motion about sustainable building
prior to the project, which helped to increase the support for the project. The project developer of
Zwijsen successfully lobbied for a motion that would reduce the fee for the building permit, which is
proportional to the building costs and was high due to the costs of the energy sustainability measures
and techniques. The project developer was also successful in lobbying to overrule the negative advice
of the aesthetics committee for the built environment, so Zwijsen could have its solar collectors.
Furthermore, Endona, Aardehuizen, and Schoonschip received a provincial subsidy, e.g., to hire
an architect or for feasibility studies. Aardehuizen also received a European subsidy for the community
building, although this had to be partly paid back, as the building could not be realised in time.
At the national level, no specific representation of the experiments exists. RVO reports on their
progress to the ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, but only from their position as an executive
organisation, not as lobbyists. For this reason, it is unlikely that the experiences of the experimenters
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will be influential in the revision of energy law, especially because the experimenters were not asked
for their input during the consultation for the draft of the follow-up executive order.
6. Conclusions and Discussion
We studied the EDSEP as an example of a regulatory sandbox, a participatory experimentation
environment for exploring the revision of the Electricity Act. When projects receive a derogation under
the EDSEP, they can perform new tasks and combine roles that are otherwise legally separated and
thereby deliberately unbundled to protect the consumer and safeguard security of supply, affordability,
and safety. On the one hand, the project grids can act at the same time as the supplier, producer,
and distributor of energy, managing an own mini grid. On the other hand, the large experiments
cooperate with the DSO, while the grid remains owned by the grid operator, and are concerned with
flattening the usage profile and balancing supply and demand.
By taking on these tasks, experimenters become part of a polycentric energy system with
decision-making units at several levels. Interested in their functioning, we asked ourselves the question:
What can be learnt about local energy initiatives’ bottom-up experimentation with smart grids in a
polycentric energy system? In this section, we conclude on our findings and discuss our conceptual
framework, and then put these in a broader perspective of legal innovation for energy transition.
6.1. Lessons Learnt from Participative Experimentation under the EDSEP
For potential experiments, the EDSEP has shown to be a complicated procedure with limited
attractiveness for local energy initiatives, which resulted in only 18 experiments of the potential 80 in a
four-year period. We want to make four main points, related to the four criteria for the well-functioning
of polycentric decision-making structures.
• Efficiency: Combining exemptions with a pro-active nurturing of experimentation
The EDSEP’s exemptions should make the integration of RE and grid balancing more attractive,
which adds to the overall efficiency of the energy system. The EDSEP enables taking on new roles, but
taking on these roles is hardly attractive or facilitated in the polycentric constellation. First, our case
studies show that the EDSEP provides only a modest improvement for the business case of smart grids
at the project grid level, and that for the large experiments we studied a good business case has not yet
been found due to the limited financial attractiveness and the large organizational capacity required
for taking on the balancing and supply roles while they come with considerable financial risks.
Second, for developing the experiments, there is no financial support available and, therefore,
the experimenters have to rely solely on their own political efficacy and networking capacities to attract
subsidies, or partners with knowledge or capital to invest. RVO has an important task to distribute
subsidies for energy innovations, especially for innovations in the early stages. Hence, a special fund
or subsidy for experiments would fit in seamlessly in the overall aims of the RVO. In addition to this,
we suggest that more support should be created to overcome knowledge differences in small-scale
volunteer organizations.
Third, alignment between decision-making units, such as the DSOs, ACM, and the experiments,
was initially lacking due to poor communication with the other actors about the regulation by RVO,
which made it harder to establish a productive collaboration with these decision-making units. This
reduced the efficiency of experimentation, as enrolling such established actors in their network is very
beneficial for bottom-up technological innovation projects [42].
Hence, our findings suggest that the smart-grid niche that the EDSEP provides lacks sufficient
nurturing to function efficiently [43]. Nurturing can take place through assisting learning processes,
articulating expectations, and helping networking processes [43]. All of these could be strengthened to
increase the efficiency of the polycentric constellation that is created under the EDSEP.
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• Control: the benefits and limitations of the new roles
The EDSEP fulfills a need to explore regulation that better facilitates the integration of intermittent
resources. By making use of the EDSEP, the experimenters can take on new roles as grid managers
(for project grids even the role of grid owners is possible) and as energy suppliers. For project grids,
we saw that this incentivizes grid balancing through providing the opportunity to bring down the
DSO costs by minimizing the exchange of energy (import or export) between the project grid and the
regional grid. Additionally, the exemption from getting a supply permit is used for the project grids,
but, in both cases, the administration has been outsourced to either an energy company or a company
related to the project developer. These tasks require more time and expertise than the local initiatives
could give and, therefore, they chose to outsource the tasks to commercial organizations.
Taking on the roles of supplier and balancing agent is more difficult when it comes to extra
control for the large grids. First, when it comes to supply, the customer base is bigger than for the
small projects, so the risks of, for instance, late payments are also higher, but the company is still
not big enough (or not sure whether it is in the case of Endona) to carry these risks. Second, when
it comes to taking the role of grid manager for a larger area, this is complicated due to the fact
that for flattening the usage profile, adjustable capacity is required to create a good business case,
which is expensive for experimenters, as it has to come largely from storage because they cannot
use industrial partners’ capacity, as their participants have to be mainly households. Furthermore,
as only the local experimenters could experiment with tariff structures and the regional DSOs not,
business opportunities regarding balancing are limited. Lastly, the supplier role of the BRP is out of
reach for the experimenters, as the software for this is too expensive and the risks too high for the
small-scale experiments.
Thus, having the opportunity to take more control over the local energy system from a legal
perspective does not always mean that all of this control can be taken over and all new roles can be
enacted. Some of the tasks are not (yet) feasible, mostly due to financial, organizational, practical, or
sometimes legal constraints. However, despite the fact that experimenters cannot take full control,
the EDSEP provides end-user collectives with an incentive to balance their grid, e.g., enabling p-2-p
supply without intervention of a DSO.
• Political representation: approach sustainability more holistically in policymaking
Experimentation would have been more effective if the Dutch tax authority was enabled by the
ministry of Finance to co-experiment and to, for instance, exempt the experiments from double taxation
on storage. However, communication regarding the EDSEP between the ministries of Economic Affairs
and Climate and Finance was lacking. Some projects have tried to come up with project designs to pay
less energy tax. However, no exceptions or reduced tariffs were granted to these relatively small energy
cooperatives, in contrast to the tax rulings for large international companies. Hence, similarly to the
work of Kooij et al. on niche–regime interactions between the tax authority and collective PV producers,
our case also ‘illustrates the political and power-laden nature of sustainability transitions, going beyond
the focus on organizational and technological challenges’ [44] (p.10). Ultimately, the EDSEP-sandbox
shows that an experiment is not always fully a two-way regulatory dialogue between an experimenter
and a regulator.
Furthermore, the lack of alignment between ministries shows that the development of policies
that affect sustainability evolve in parallel worlds, and a more holistic approach is needed [1]. Stepping
away from silo thinking and strengthening inter-ministerial alignment would be helpful in designing
effective energy transition policies. Stronger political representation of a lobby organizations or
intermediaries [45,46] at the national level would also be useful in this case. For instance, EnergieSamen,
a Dutch lobby organization for local energy initiatives, could take on such a role.
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• Local autonomy: a legislative balance between self-responsibility and the protection of consumers
The experiments show that, while the HOA and cooperative seem to be structures that are explicitly
designed for high commitment of the involved households, these do not, per se, imply a high level of
participation by all participants. In the context of smart electricity, energy legislation needs to strike
the balance between opportunities for self-responsibility and the protection of consumers [1]. Options
for users to shape their own energy system are desirable in the context of energy democracy [26],
but consumer protection against high prices could be threatened, e.g., when making tariffs flexible.
Therefore, further experimentation with legal innovation should not only explore how legalislation
can be facilitative of technological innovation, but also of social innovations to create an energy system
that represents the interests of its users and is acceptable to them. Involving local energy initiatives or
users cannot function as the sole mechanism of user involvement, because our cases show that such a
characteristic does not always guarantee high participation. Furthermore, adequate insight of end
users in the experiment necessary to protect their interests might be lacking.
6.2. Theoretical Reflection on Polycentricity
The advantage of the concept of polycentricity is that an actor constellation can be described by
four different actor-characteristics (level, type, sector, and function), which provide helpful tools for
understanding the context of experimentation. We find that this concept provides more guidance for our
study in defining actor roles and their position in the energy system than e.g., the multi-level perspective
(MLP), which predominantly focuses on levels and rather general dimensions, such as science, market
preferences, technology, socio-cultural, and policy [47]. With the concept of polycentricity, it is easy to
see what a nested system of decision-making units looks like and in which ways it is layered, whereas
MLP puts more focus on which sectors (market, science, policy, etc.) are represented in a system.
Furthermore, the concepts for evaluating the role of actors in polycentric systems (local autonomy,
control, efficiency, and political representation) help to understand what is necessary for a decision-making
unit in such a system to function well. They were especially helpful when studying legal innovations
due to the inclusion of the concepts of control and political representation. The same goes for studying
participative bottom-up innovation due to the inclusion of local autonomy. Lastly, the concept efficiency
helps to understand whether the decision-making unit can provide added value to the system, which
is a useful indicator in assessing whether sustainability experiments contribute to an efficient progress
towards a more sustainable energy system.
However, it needs to be realised that, while using these concepts, the success of the experimenters
in the polycentric context does not equal the value of the experiment for legal innovation. When
evaluating the experiments, the question should also be whether the experiment has resulted in new
insights for guiding energy transition, in this case study for revising energy law, and not only whether
the experimentation constellation itself is efficient in providing added value. Learning potential,
instead of replication potential, should be central in evaluating experimentation for legal innovation.
Furthermore, the analytical framework is focused on the functioning of the polycentric system, but
does not give theoretical guidance on what actors can do to nurture experimentation, or how they can
better work together and create alignment in the system. Strategic niche management and actor-network
theory may be helpful frameworks to further explore these aspects of innovation management.
6.3. Final Remarks
For the Dutch legislators, learning from the EDSEP experiences is important, because the EDSEP
is only the start of experimentation informing revisions of energy law. A follow-up of the EDSEP has
already been drafted, being based on the 2018 Law Progress Energy Transition. This executive order
expands the size of experiments, experimenting actors, and also enables experiments under the Gas
Act. The new regulation has been presented to the parliament in May 2019 and new experiments
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can apply once the new executive order has received positive advice of the Council of State, which is
expected early 2020.
We would like to briefly summarize the conclusions of this study, so they can be taken into account
for the evaluation of the EDSEP as well as for future experimentation. Experimentation under the
EDSEP shows us that inter-actor alignment was initially lacking and pro-active nurturing would have
smoothened the implementation. Furthermore, EDSEP experimenters faced significant constraints, had
very limited political representation, and varying representation of the users within the experiment.
As a starting point to improve both the well-functioning of the experiments and the quality of
the learning process, an intermediary could be more of a bridge between national and regional actors
and the locally operating experimenters, and take a more active role in developing a knowledge base,
providing project development support, spreading knowledge in the polycentric experimentation
system, and extending the learning community. A first option for this could be an extension of the role
of the executive organization, RVO, as it is already involved in the derogation process. In the Scottish
context, Community Energy Scotland, which provides such support, also grew from a governmental
initiative. Alternatively, the national community energy platform Hieropgewekt could take on this
role, or even the regional umbrella organizations for energy cooperatives. Yet, to realize this, such
intermediaries should pro-actively follow developments in energy legislation relevant for local energy
initiatives and attract or train expert staff that can assist experimenters with their project development.
As many of such organizations do not have the financial means for this, a government that truly wants
to support inclusive innovation and transition processes should allocate budget to them for staff time.
Thus far, a lot has been expected from the experimenters without much active facilitation.
Resultantly, the distribution between the risks of and incentives for experimentation is rather uneven
and, therefore, it could have been expected that experimenters’ progress was relatively slow and
interest in new roles limited. This decreased the potential of the sandbox for generating lessons
for revising energy regulation to facilitate energy transition. A more holistic approach, inter-actor
alignment, the availability of expert support by an intermediary, and facilitation of a more close-knit
learning community would bring benefits to the bottom-up participatory innovation.
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Appendix A
Table A1 displays an overview of EDSEP projects.
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Table A1. Overview of EDSEP experiments.
Year Name Type(Project/Large) Legal Entity Project Goals Scale
2015 Parq Green P HOA Collective PV, sustainable heat 292 recreational houses
Black Jack/Withdrawn L
Experiment DDE
Collegepark Zwijsen P HOA




Endona EXP L Coop
Generation, cooperation with biodigester,
supply to members, increasing direct usage,
EMS, storage.
47 with EMS and
towards 5000 members
in 10 years
2016 Schoonschip P HOA EMS, generation, batteries, heat pumps,heat storage in buffer and smart appliances 46 water houses
Noordstraat 111
Tilburg P HOA EMS, generation, smaller grid connection
3 houses in old office
(owned)




Aardehuizen e.o. L HOA
Community battery, EVs, EMS, generation,
no gas, smart software dynamic electricity
tariffs and demand response, p-2-p.
3 rental and 20 owned
Kringloopgemeenschap
Bodegraven-Reeuwijk L Coop Generation and determining own tariff 2500 households






P-2-P, EVs, blockchain, storage, generation,
smart software.
100–200 social houses;
scaling up to 1500
Micro Energy Trading





L Coop Generation, EMS, batteries, EV chargers,and tariff differentiation





Generation, heat pumps, no gas, battery
and EVs
33 newly built houses
(2017) with communal
garden
Zeuven heuvels Wezep P Coop EMS, generation, no gas, own grid. 57 newly built houses
Smart energy grid
Bajeskwartier L Coop
Generation, neighborhood battery, EVs,
heat pumps and thermal storage, smart






Katwijk/ Gave Buren P Coop
Balancing, joint electricity purchase and





L Coop P-2-P, car sharing with EVs 400–800 houses ofhousing cooperation
2019 Cooperatie zonneparkBad Noordzee U.A. P Coop Heat pumps, P-2-P, PV, battery storage.
322 recreational houses
and a few large use
connections
Appendix B
Table A2 displays an overview of interviewed actors.
Table A2. Overview of interviewed actors.
Interviewed Actor Type of Interview
Resident of case Schoonschip Face-to-face
Resident of case Aardehuizen Face-to-face
Project developer of case Collegepark Zwijsen Face-to-face
Resident board member and advisor of case Endona Face-to-face
Grid operators from the different territorial jurisdictions, who engage with experiments (3) Phone (all 3) and onealso face-to-face
Energy company staff member: EnergieVanOns & Nuts&co. (2) Phone
RVO Phone
Policy maker ministry of Economic Affairs Phone
Tax authority staff member
Consultant in legal, technical and fiscal aspects of renewable energy and energy efficiency.
Focus on complex projects and political processes.
Phone
Face-to-face
Employee regional umbrella cooperative for supporting local energy cooperatives Phone
Management, ICT, energy and sustainability advisor, creator of web environment with
information overview for EDSEP experimenters Face-to-face
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